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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. W. BROADWATER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GLEN VAN TASSELL, ERJv1A VA.i'l TASSELL, 
his wife, and DICK VAN TASSELL, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
GLEN V.l>JI TASSELL, and ERMA VAN 
TASSELL, his wife, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
VS, 
J. W. BROADWATER and JANE DOE 
BROADWATER, his wife, and A.i'lDREW 
R. BIRRELL, JR., and PATRICIA J. 
BIRRELL, his wife, and JOSEPH H. 
SHOOL and JA.i'lE DOE SHOOL, his 
wife, 
Third Party Defendants. 
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OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. W. BROADWATER, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
GLE:-1 VAN TASSELL, ERMA VAN 
TASSELL, his wife, and DICK 
V . .\:i Ll.SSELL, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
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VAN fASSELL, his wife, 
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Third Party Plain-
tiffs, 
J. IV. BROADWATER and J."u\IE 
DOE BRO . .l.DWATER, his wife, 
and ANDREW R. BIRRELL, JR. , 
md PATRICIA J. BIRRELL, 
his wife, and JOSEPH H. 
SHOOL and JANE DOE SHOOL, 
his wife, 
Third Party Defen-
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Case No. 15319 
APPELLA.\ITS' REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
),lt bd1iJ,·,ring the points raised in Appellants' initial 
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brief and Respondents' brief it suffices to say that th , e q,,,. 
tion of sufficiency of evidence and the discretion of the tr 
court in refusing to accept newly-offered evidence are 50 ir.: 
woven that they cannot be logically separated. 
As has been stated previously the trial court was face6 
with two diametrically opposed stories. Van Tassell claime2 
that he had paid Broadwater the full amount of the obligatior 
and even an excess. Broadwater, on the other hand, claimed 
that only a very small portion of the debt had been paid to 
him. Since there was no question as to the initial obligatic: 
incurred by Van Tassell as evidenced by the notes and mortga; 
the sole question for determination was that of receipts--11er, 
the gasoline receipts offered by Van Tassell sufficient evi· 
dence to show payment of the debt? 
Respondents in their brief emphasize that Van Tassell 
adamantly stated that the gasoline receipts were not signed 
by Broadwater until the amount of payment had been physicaL 
placed upon the receipt. (Respondents' Brief, PP· 6-7). !'.·: 
theory then continues that since Mr. Grube testified that Lo 
. 11 · coses oi examination of the receipts showed that in a si.:< " 
1 d before ,:11 the receipts examined the signatures were p ace 
payment notations that it was conclusive that Van Tassell'"'' 
have altered the receipts after Broadwater had merely sig~.:: 
them for gasoline. 
-2-
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It should be noted, however, that only six of the four-
teen disputed receipts could be examined by Mr. Grube. This 
left eight receipts with no examination. A review of the tes-
tirnony by ~Ir. Van Tassell hardly shows that he was positive 
as to the order of the signatures but in fact stated that in 
so~ instances the gasoline would have been signed for by Mr. 
Broadwater and that the notations would be placed on the re-
ceipt after such signature. A few brief excerpts of the tes-
tirnony show this fact. 
Q. (By Mr. Fullmer) Okay now, back to 
these receipts. Did you ever get the 
receipt made out and signed and about 
to take it out and then the money was 
discussed? 
A. That happened quite a few different 
times. 
Q. So in a circumstance, when was this 
information about paying, receiving 
money from you to him be put on there? 
A. Well, it was in the machine and while 
we were talking. 
Q. So would his signature be on it or 
not? 
A. His signature, when I gave him the--
no, his signature wasn't on it till 
I wrote it out and then we would sign 
it, 
Q. But then for instance, you could tell 
if he had signed it before you put 
this, number l+, if he signed it be-
fore you put this $2,500 on it or after, 
can you? 
- 3 -
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A. >lo. Sometimes he got the gas and 
signed and then we would be talkino 
and maybe I would pay him and mayb; 
he would already have signed it. I 
wouldn't say that it couldn't have 
happened, but generally he would sign 
it after he got the money and stuff. 
It could have happened, I wouldn't 
say it didn't, but it was signed be-
fore it was ever taken out of the box 
and he had a copy of it. (Tr., p. 
10 9) . 
Respondent cites page 137 of the transcript to support \'a:. 
Tassell's sureness of the order of signature. (Responden: 0 
brief, p. 7). A review of this testimony shows that Van 
Tassell was anything but sure. 
Q. (By Mr. Tibbals) Had you written 
that on there at the time Mr. Broad-
water signed that receipt? 
A. I did. 
Q. It was written on there at the 
time he signed it? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
As far as I know, that's the way I 
remember. It's put on the machine 
and then he signed it and we would 
give it to him and he would sign on--
sometimes he may have signed it and 
I wrote it on there and gave him 
the machine or gave him the money. 
Well, that becomes quite significant, 
doesn't it, because if he didn't put 
his name on there after you wrote the 
$2,500 on there, he wasn't receipting 
for the $2,500, was he? He was just 
receipting for the gas? 
Well no, what he did was get the gas 
and then he would sign, might have 
signed it. I wouldn't sav that he 
did or didn't, but then he would then 
-4-
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say, "Do you want to give me any 
money?" and sometimes I would give 
it to him and write it there. I 
couldn't say. Sometimes it had been 
signed before and sometimes after, 
but most of the time I would say, 
ninety-nine per cent of the time, he 
would sign it after I gave him the 
money. But, I can't remember exact-
ly. There is a possibility. (Tr., 
p. 137). 
Neither Broadwater nor Van Tassell disputed the fact that 
all signatures were made in the machine. Nor was there any 
dispute that the receipts contained three separate pieces of 
paper separated by carbons which were disgarded at the time 
the three copies were removed from the machine and the perfor-
ated ends were broken. Testimony was clear that Broadwater 
either received a pink copy or a yellow copy of the invoice. 
Broadwater produced no copies of any receipts at the trial. 
Van Tassell claimed that all the writing was done in the 
machine and that Broadwater accordingly signed it in the ma-
chine. If, as Respondent claims, Van Tassell altered the ori-
ginal white receipt after it had been removed from the machine 
and a copy given to Broadwater then he would also have had to 
have altered the second copy in order to show a consistent re-
s ult, Unfortunately for Van Tassell the crucial yellow re-
ceipts 'O · · 1 c ncern1ng the fourteen payment entries were not avai -
-'J le 4 h 
co im at the time of trial and were therefore not intro-
i.ncCJ "cideTJ.ce. ''lr. Grube testified that for the copies 
-5-
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to be aligned after they had been removed from the 
would have been extremely difficult and would have req·~ir:: 
someone of competence who knew how to use special eaui"-c--
, .r. ~ . ._ 
order to make the copies consistent. (Tr., p. 177). 
Certainly, the existence of a second duplicate ('.O~:: _, 
the disputed receipts and the admitted difficulty in dupli-
eating such receipt out of the machine could have been a 
serious consideration for a trier of fact in that '.!r. Brc,:-
water produced no receipts contradicting the fourteen re-
ceipts in dispute. 
Van Tassell after inadvertently discovering these c::i,_ 
receipts after trial as explained in his affidavit of Jul .. · 
1977 (R., pp. 437-440) attempted to offer these duplicate-: 
pies to the trial court for its consideration. (R., p. ]JJ 
This offer was rejected by the trial court who obviousl:: '.: 
made up its mind and refused to examine this new evidence. 
While Appellant Van Tassell realizes a great deal o'. :: 
cretion is left to a trial court in determining whether a:' 
trial should be granted because of evidence it is also-~:;;­
that the trial court must view the evidence objectivelv ac 
cannot refuse such consideration of this new evidence. 
trial court obviously believed that Van Tassell had pur5e: 
'-- h court' 5 -
self on the stanC. concerning the receipts JV t e 
ment suggesting to the plaintiff that the Count:: 
contacted. (Tr., p. 19l). It thus stand5 cJ reJ-' 11 :· 
-6-
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;'~bsequent cffers of proof were highly questioned by the trial 
court as 3. furtherance of this scheme. 
There can be no doubt that had these duplicate copies 
1een introduced at trial originally a serious question would 
~a::e :J.Tisen as to Van Tassell 's original story that the sig-
natures and notations were done in the machine before being 
given to Broadwater. The failure of Broadwater to produce a 
single contradictory receipt in rebuttal would then give ere-
iihli ty to Van Tasse 11. 
Appellant therefore submits that the omission of these 
documents together with those mentioned in the motion concern-
ing checks and other receipts were prejudicial to Van Tassell 
and as stated in the affidavit could not have been produced 
at the trial. Appellant further submits that if a new trial 
··ere held these documents would have a substantial effect upon 
m impartial trier of fact and could be further analyzed by 
anv experts either side might wish to call. For these reasons, 
the trial court erred in failincr to conclude that these docu-
o 
ments may have had a significant effect upon the outcome of 
the trial d · f · h h d an in ailing to grant a new trial so t at sue o-
:,Jments could be introduced. 
For this r9ason, a new trial should be ordered to give 
. .:~,Tassell the opportunity to present this evidence. 
"s ir;·.:ei i:i °'DDellants' brief in chief the court's de-
-7-
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cision at trial was not supported by the evidence. This i; 
especially true in two areas. First, attorney's fees and,, 
cond, interest. 
As to attorney's fees the court arbitrarily awarded 2 ~. 
proximately $8,000 in attorney's fees to the plaintiff. (r. 
pp. 191-192). The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of La 11 
prepared by plaintiffs' attorney repeatedly reflect the no· 
tation "a reasonable attorney's fee". (R., pp. 378-386J. : 
judgment and decree of foreclosure also reflect the award c.; 
attorney's fees in excess of $8,000. 
The record is absolutely void of any evidence presen:;; 
by plaintiff concerning reasonable attorney's fees. The rt,; 
is also void of any stipulation or agreement allowing the c:. 
to make this conclusion based upon the court's own knowlec;e 
The absence of any evidence to subs tan tia te these attorne::'' 
fees requires a modification of the judgment vacating this 
amount. 
This Court in F.M .. .\.. Financial Corporation v. 3uild_l2.: 
17 Utah Zd 80, 404 P.Zd 670 (1965) was faced with an iden:::: 
problem concerning the absence of evidence to support an a"·': 
of attorney's fees. The Court stated that it is fundamer.t': 
that a judgment be based upon findings of fact which int'' 
must be based upon the evidence. The Court ackn·J' . ;ledge~ :< 
judges have a special knowledge as to 
-8-
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vices and that if submitted upon stipulation a court may fix 
the amow1t of attorney's fees without formally hearing evidence. 
:·:ithout such evidenciary hearing or stipulation, however, this 
court concluded that a judgment for attorney's fees must fail. 
The Court stated: 
Any one of these would have provided an 
evidenciary basis for making the deter-
mination. However, it was an issue of 
fact which was denied. Thus it was a part 
of the plaintiff's case to which it had 
the burden of proving. Failing to offer 
proof of any character on this issue had 
the same effect as would the failure to 
offer proof as to any other controverted 
issue. There is nothing upon which to 
base a finding. The defendant's objec-
tion that the finding as to attorney's 
fees is not supported by any evidence is 
well-taken and the judgment must be cor-
rected in that particular. (404 P. Zd at 
673-674). 
While it is true that appellants did not dispute the exis-
tence of the notes and mortgages there is no amount established 
in the notes or mortgages concerning a reasonable attorney's 
fee. Plaintiff failed in its burden of showing what a reason-
able attorney's fee was in reference to those notes and mort-
gages admitted into evidence. For this reason, the award of 
attornev' s fees should be vacated. 
Finallv 
'' 
the court granted judgment with interest at 8 per 
ce,H prior to the time of judgment. Even though the testimony 
to the effect that Van Tassell defaulted al-
ir all obligations the court allowed 8 per 
-9-
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cent interest to be charged even thouah the notes spe f ~ Cl lCa 
stated "legal" interest. Exhibits L, G, and E all refer cc· 
either "legal" or "legal rate" when speaking i·n ~ - - terms oi in-
terest at default. The notes read as follows: 
Any installments of principal and interest 
not paid when due shall, at the option of 
the legal holder hereof, bear interest there-
after at the rate of (legal) per annum until 
paid. 
Only Exhibit J in the amow1t of $4, 500 specifically stated 
"eight" per cent per annum. 
Since Section 15-1-1 defines the legal rate of interes-
before judgment as 6 per cent the court obviously erred i". 
puting the 8 per cent rate. Thus, this Court should orde:, 
recomputa tion of the interest as to those no"Ces containing 
the legal rate amount and should r.-.odify the judgment accori· 
ingly. Peterson v. Western Casualtv and Surety Company, i:: 
P.2d 769 (Utah 1967). 
In summary, the trial cour"C obviously chose to belie':C 
Broadwater' s version of the story as opposed to Van Tasse'.: 
This was his privilege. However, this belief could not p:'· 
vent the court from objectively looking at new evidence cc: 
available at trial which could have had a substantial e::::· 
~.: ~; 
upon the court's decision had it been originally intro,,,_., 
The failure to give Van Tassell an opportunity to 
this evidence anew to a an impartial trier of fact was er: 
-10-
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Regardless of the other subjective areas of decision con-
cerning the court's judgment and findings there can be no 
doubt that Broadwater failed to prove what a reasonable attar-
~ey's fee would be under the circumstances and failed to ob-
tain a stipulation that the court could decide this question 
without evidence. Further, the court erred in allowing 8 per 
cent interest on obligations which clearly stated the legal 
rate of interest which is 6 per cent. 
For these reasons, if the judgment is affirmed it should 
be modified accordingly. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~bk 
Attorney for Appellants 
-11-
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